Rubin rightly deserves an award for turning the season around. At the beginning of August it seemed that the team would have a difficult fight for survival with mediocre chances. Now Kazan is already in the top half of the table and is 13 points away from the direct relegation zone. This is partly due to transfers that occurred when the window closed. Vada, although not always starting, contributes points with important goals, Cumic shows well as a winger and Rashid Rakhimov found a not so obvious place in the midfield for Randjelovic.
However, the transfers are only part of the story, because in the last line, for example, there have been no important changes. But if at the beginning of the season Rubin lost a lot, then since the beginning of October in six games the team stopped allowing goals into its own goal. This is already the good work of Rakhimov, who definitely deserves respect for his flexibility in a crisis situation (you yourself remember the rumors about his imminent resignation) and the adjustments made to the team’s defensive work.
We have already told you that Rubin transfers are not everything:
“Rubin” in the fall is at the level of “Zenith”. What is the secret of Rakhimov’s brilliant team?
In short, Rubin’s main playing problems at the beginning of the season were:
The team had enough sparkling pressure and chances created in transitions for half an hour. Then they let out the Kazan air: powerful pressing seemed especially losing in conditions of extreme heat, when it was necessary to save energy for the entire match; The 5-3-2 in defense often left the center open for attack. The “Eights” were forced to divide between the flank zones and the axis of the field, and the rivals, getting out of the pressure, had good chances to attack in the center; Iwu is very focused on the opponent’s movement. . If someone appears between the lines or starts an active movement after appearing in front of him, Iwu will almost certainly follow his opponent. A textbook example is the match against Spartak and the departure of Jesús Medina, who simply bored the Kazan defensive midfielder with similar openings, which finally opened the center; One way to keep the center in the 5-3-2 could be to use full-backs pressing deep: this is what often happened both against opponents with four defenders and against opponents with full-backs. In such cases, players hanging on the mid-wings became the most dangerous, and outside central defenders often advanced in line with them, opening up depth. In the same match with Spartak, Bongonda was again and again ahead of Gritsaenko, who was trying to hit him in a play; Again and again this led to the fact that Spartak could easily attack a large space without a full-back and one of the central defenders.
Rakhimov’s repair consisted of reinforcing the midline with another player. The Rubin coach sacrificed a forward and the desire to always press as hard as possible for two things: good organization of the last line and compactness between the defense and the midline. Having switched to 5-4-1 in defense, the Kazan team began to cover the center more closely with penetrating passes, at the same time solving the problem of “eights” scattered across the field. Now the opponent’s winger or winger is often occupied not by the Kazan winger, but by the winger – Vada or Chumich. This leaves the last line intact: it still has five players and remains that way. This is a big change from the start of the season, when a pass from the opposition to his side could cause the chain to leave Vujacic and another centre-back on Rubin’s last line. At the same time, Rakhimov has not lost the ability to launch quick attacks: Chumich gives even more than a second striker could, and the presence of Randjelovic closer to the center gives another player ready to quickly go on the attack and attack not from wide, but from close to the target position.
I am not tasked with talking about Rubin’s attacks, although there is something to pay attention to. For example, how Randjelovic himself strengthens the top line with the inclusion of a sixth player, or how Gritsaenko revealed himself as a connected central defender (obviously, he likes the current way of playing better; this can be seen in his reaction al on the field; yesterday he hit a penetrating and beautiful shot at Chumic, Alexey exceeded his strength and reacted instantly to an ordinary episode as if he had missed the main opportunity of his life). In fact, much of what Rubin is doing now is inspired by Vladimir Fedotov’s CSKA, and at times Kazan performs even a little better than the army team. In this sense, it is quite symbolic that at the beginning of winter Rubin and CSKA were equal on points in the table.
I will try to explain with an example how Kazan’s new defense works and what principles are followed when playing without the ball in each match. Thus, the match against Sochi, the opponent’s positional attack.
Match between Rubin and Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
After turning the attack into his own half, it is not very convenient for the far winger to encounter the opponent; In such cases, if the player in width does not remain free, this is done by the left back Bezrukov, who burst in with enthusiasm. the starting lineup of Rakhimov’s team.
Fragment of the match with Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
The opponent stops and makes a cross pass a little behind: Rubin’s defense takes a few steps forward, increasing the compactness between the lines and leaving the attacker out of the game without further thoughts. Bezrukov rushes into his position as one of Sochi’s forwards began to drift.
Fragment of the match with Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
The pass goes directly to him, and here it is important that the left central defender Gritsaenko remains in his position (after a moment he will look into the penalty area: it is empty in order to understand whether he should go lower and not open further), and to the receiver of the ball Bezrukov runs towards the player. The line at this moment remains patiently above the Sochi striker; This simply keeps the area empty, meaning the opponent needs additional intermediate passes to attack.
Fragment of the match with Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
Bezrukov began to play towards the center, increasing the probability of a pass into the box. As soon as this possibility arises, Vujacic runs over the attacker and turns towards him, ready to play 1 on 1 against a possible cross or cross. Randjelovic remains Bezrukov’s safety, but the streak also begins on the sidelines.
Fragment of the match with Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
Chumich practices this run as disciplined as possible: Rubin tries to control all runs during flank play as clearly as possible (problems arise in situations where the flank pass is ready without intermediate passes, we will talk about this later). Teslenko joins Vujacic, moving to a possible personal play if the pass enters the area.
Fragment of the match with Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
Sochi is deprived of the opportunity to play immediately in the box, forcing the team to make another intermediate back pass. The steps forward and the role of Vujacic are very important here, as he pushes his teammates to play higher in each game. Those few meters traveled by the last line of the back pass seem insignificant, but they are vitally important as a principle: the penalty area is cleared again, the attackers must rebound or remain offside. At the same time, Chumich disciplinedly sat in a lateral position behind Bezrukov, who chased his opponent to the support zone.
Fragment of the match with Sochi
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
The opponent again plays on the flank, Vujačić and Teslenko again play against the opponent, Čumić receives the pass from a lateral position and again we see how the attack is controlled in the most disciplined way, this time in the middle. -Flank, accompanied by Randjelović, who does not allow the opponent to make a penetrating pass to the edge of the area. Sochi was left without players for intermediate passes, and Bezrukov, after another back pass, easily pushes the opponent into touch.
The principles of controlling runs during wing play, switching to man-marking in the penalty area, controlling depth by leaving five players on the last line, and taking steps forward while passing backwards disciplined Rubin’s game throughout. late autumn. The principle of compactness remains important, which is observed not only in the lower block, but also in the highest areas of the field. Let’s see the situation of the match against CSKA.
Fragment of the match with CSKA
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
The opponent has the ball open in the central axis, but it is very important that the defense does not begin to collapse, but also leaves the attacker offside here. It seems simple, because it is difficult not to react to a striker as big as Anton Zabolotny: when you defend intuitively, you always want to have him in front of you. But Rakhimov’s team suffers again and again in such situations, achieving the main thing: the last line does not retreat ahead of time, the distance between the defense and the middle line does not increase, and the space between the lines does not increase. any. CSKA has no special options for the game.
Maybe everyone plays like this against Zabolotny? This is bad. This is the standard story: Krylia Sovetov here also formally has five players on the back line.
Fragment of the match between CSKA and Krylya Sovetov
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
The central defender begins to sit behind Zabolotny, which will force the rest of the line to sit at his level. This increases the distance between the lines and automatically gives CSKA more playing options.
Problems for Rubin arise most often in two situations: when he plays on the flank without running (that is, the pass went to the flank and the serve immediately passed from there); This was the case in Yekaterinburg, and Kazan finished the match with six players on the last line) and with a maximum saturation of the central axis with opposing players. In this context, paradoxically, Rakhimov’s team has more difficulties with Fakel than with CSKA, which is balanced on the field. Below is a brief example of how moments arise that violate the compactness between the Kazan lines.
Fragment of the match between Rubin and Fakel
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
The ball is at approximately the same point as in the game against CSKA, but the difference is that Fakel has five players between the lines in the central axis, a standard situation in this match. This will greatly unbalance Fakel, but so far Rubin has difficulty putting pressure on the opponent’s defensive line in situations where he allows himself to be pressured. Appaev’s opening behind the back is usually controlled correctly by Vuyachich, but this will inevitably lead to the space between the lines growing, and Voronezh has a multitude of players there.
Fragment of the match with “Fakel”
Photo: Frame of the transmission.
As soon as the compactness is broken and the pass passes between the lines, a fire begins: a maximum of Fakel’s players are torn along the central axis, and Appaev, with whom the episode began, falls to the flank and performs a throw-in. instantaneous edge. when the area is full of Voronezh players. These situations are the main difficulty for Rubin’s generally well-organized defense, and here lies the main potential for Rashid Rakhimov’s future work. To minimize them, it is necessary to work on squeezing the openings behind the back more horizontally (without breaking the compactness) or organize the pressure on the defenders in such a way that they cannot easily advance the ball between the lines.
In any case, seeing how Rubin transforms as the season progresses is extremely interesting.
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THE NAIS IS OFFICIAL EDITOR ON NAIS NEWS